Follow-up to Unintended Consequences

Had to log off before I had quite said all I wanted to say yesterday, as Mrs. Drang had woken up from her nap and it was time to get working on dinner. Possibly the wait helped.

The thing is that, just because conventional "Military Force" only ended 7% of terrorist groups does not mean that conventional military units are incapable of contributing to the end of a terrorist group. (I find the whole referring to "the end of a terrorist group" thing awkward, but that is the terminology RAND chose for their study.) The fact that RAND included actions by intelligence agencies under the law enforcement rubric speaks volumes; the FBI is a law enforcement agency, the CIA is not. Nor are the NSA, the DIA, etc. USSOCOM is certainly a military organization--albeit not conventional--which occasionally works for the CIA.

Furthermore, I would suggest that the tactics currently in use by our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are what you might call up-armored community based policing. The fact that you have a conventional unit's patch on your left shoulder and US ARMY or US MARINES or even US AIR FORCE or US NAVY over your left pocket--yes, all services have field uniforms, and even the Marines' uniforms have their names over their right pockts and US MARINES over the left--does not make that foot patrol through the neighborhood, stopping in at Mr. Mohammad's falafel shop to see how his kid is doing, hearing the gossip (which might include some good intel), any less police work.

So this morning I can't sleep due to the heat--85 in Seattle! Incredible!--and I get up at 0700, and check my email and my RSS feeds. And Threats Watch has a link to aPajamas Media post By Richard Fernandez, whom I am not familiar with. (Well, hey, ya' can't know 'em all!) In his post
The Battle of the Ghosts--which does not directly address the RAND study, until somewhere in the comments section--Mr. Fernandez concludes with the following:

The lethality of information may eventually modify the role of the traditional armies from that of being the primary delivery mechanism of force to that of protecting the gatherers of information. One reason why ground forces will remain vital into the 21st century is that they alone are capable of providing security for people. In a counterinsurgency campaign where the population itself becomes the primary source of “tips”, protecting the people protects the fountainheads of information. {Emphasis added. DWD} Once the information is in hand, the lethal force can follow, often within seconds. This probably one reason why the Surge worked. The security provided by US forces and new Iraqi units yielded vast information dividends. And information is fatal to al-Qaeda.

Perhaps it is fallacious to believe that intelligence operations and diplomacy can be neatly separated from military activity in the age of terrorism. Intelligence work and diplomacy — even law enforcement — cannot long survive without security. It will be interesting to watch how the US conducts its virtual maneuvers in Pakistan; it’s tenuous net of informers, signals intelligence and high-tech strike assets forming an invisible force against the phantoms of al-Qaeda. It’s a battle of the ghosts on the roof of the world.

(As a personal aside, I always hated having to stick a four- or five-man SIGINT team "out there" with less than a battalion of infantry around them. Made me feel they should replace the sphinx of our regimental crest with a sacrifical lamb...)

Here is part of Mr. Fernandez' reposnse to someone who brings up the RAND study:

I read the RAND paper and wrote an article on it at the Pajamas Media main site. The RAND corporation talks about the way terror groups end, not necessarily the way they are defeated. ...

It makes the more forceful argument that because al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan increased after September 11 ergo military action against it was ineffective. This is a flawed argument because al-Qaeda operations are perfectly correlated with operations against it. {Emphasis added. DWD} So sending forces to fight al-Qaeda would have the effect of increasing hostile contact but not necessarily mean al-Qaeda was getting stronger. {In other words, just becaus emore crimes are reported does not mean more crimes are being committed... DWD} ... (T)he argument that because al-Qaeda launched more attacks against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 ergo it got stronger is not necessarily true. They were fighting for their lives. But if you look at the end state in Iraq today, it’s hard to conclude, “right. Military force was ineffective. That’s why al-Qaeda is beaten.” If US action were so futile, then why is the end state thus? This is not necessarily a refutation of the RAND argument, but you can see why their assertion need not logically follow.

RAND also argued that al-Qaeda attacks in Muslim countries or in European countries with large Muslim populations increased after 9/11. The implication is that military action didn’t put a damper on this either. But consider for a while why it al-Qaeda failed to significantly attack the US after 9/11. Why would they attack Muslim countries instead? So you can read the RAND evidence to explain al-Qaeda’s efforts to keep their base in line. Make a show of strength in their bailiwicks. That is more indicative of weakness than strength.

Finally, the question is why, if diplomacy and intelligence alone are so effective, 9/11 itself occurred and why afterward it was never repeated when diplomacy and intelligence was augmented by military force. I think the common sense answer is that diplomacy, intelligence and military action together are the most effective. It’s a triad. Military action in Afghanistan has provided a superior base for gathering intel which would otherwise not be obtainable using pre-9/11 methods. This is not to disparage intel gathering or diplomacy. It is merely an observation that intel and diplomacy are enhanced by the judicious military operations. It’s not either or. It’s a cocktail of policies that is the best countermeasure against terrorism.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:39 pm

The answer to his final question ("why, if diplomacy and intelligence alone are so effective, 9/11 itself occurred") is, of course, that there WERE no diplomatic efforts aimed at the Taliban, let alone Al Qaeda, and there WAS no intelligence gathering against them. We had nothing. As noted in my original post on this topic, our emphasis on Law-Enforcement-based counter-terror had squeezed the military out of such operaons, and, since sources have to be named in a court trial under the US Constitution, we had essentially no HUMINT capability in the region. And, alas, SIGINT and IMINT are of minimal use on CT, or COIN.

Too bad we got so enamored of high-tech, gee-whiz intel collection toys that we forgot the basics.