A Differing Opinion

A commentator from the New York Times points out why the government should take action, even if not so precipitously as some might have wished.

Analysis: It's not just Wall Street: Risk to economy is real
Policymakers are failing to explain dangers to Main Street

By DAVID LEONHARDT
THE NEW YORK TIMES

In 1929, Meyer Mishkin owned a shop in New York that sold silk shirts to working men. When the stock market crashed that October, he turned to his son, then a student at City College, and offered a version of this sentiment: "It serves those rich gentlemen right."

A year later, as Wall Street's problems were starting to spill into the broader economy, Mishkin's store went out of business. He no longer had enough customers. His son had to go to work to support the family, and Mishkin never held a steady job again.

Frederic Mishkin -- Meyer's grandson and, until he stepped down a month ago, an ally of Ben Bernanke's on the Federal Reserve -- told me this story the other day, and its moral is obvious enough. Many people in Washington fear that the country is starting to spiral into a terrible downturn. And to their horror, they see the public, and many members of Congress, turning into modern-day Meyer Mishkins, more interested in punishing Wall Street than saving the economy.

All of which may be true. But there is some good reason for the public's skepticism. The experts and policymakers who so desperately want to take action have failed to tell a compelling story about why they're so afraid.

It's not enough to say that markets could freeze up, loans could become impossible to get and the economy could slide into its worst downturn since the Great Depression. For now, the crisis has had little effect on most Americans, beyond their 401(k) statement. So to them, the specter of a depression can sound alarmist, and the $700 billion bill that Congress voted down this week can seem like a bailout for rich gentlemen.

Bernanke and his fellow worriers need to connect the dots. They need to use their bully pulpit to teach a little lesson on the economics of a credit crisis -- how A can lead to B, B to C and C to Depression.

Let's give it a shot, then. Why are we talking about the Depression, anyway?

Almost no economist thinks that even a terrible downturn would look like the Depression. The government has already responded more aggressively than it did in Herbert Hoover's day. So a Depression-like contraction -- a 30 percent drop in economic activity -- is highly unlikely. The country is also far richer today, which means that a much smaller portion of the population is living on the edge of despair. No matter what happens, you're not likely to see shantytowns.

But the Depression is still relevant because the basic mechanics of how the economy might fall into a severe recession look quite similar to those that caused the Depression. In both cases, a credit crisis is at the center of the story.

At the start of the 1930s, despite everything that had happened on Wall Street, the U.S. economy had not yet collapsed. Consumer spending and business investment were down, but not horribly so.

In late 1930, however, a rolling series of bank panics began. Investments made by the banks were going bad -- or, in some cases, were rumored to be going bad -- and nervous customers besieged bank braches to demand their money back. Hundreds of banks eventually closed.

Once a bank in a given town shut its doors, all the knowledge accumulated by the bank officers there effectively disappeared. Other banks weren't nearly as willing to lend money to local businesses and residents because the loan officers at those banks didn't know which borrowers were less reliable than they looked. Credit dried up.

"If a guy has a good investment opportunity and he can't get the funding, he won't do it," Mishkin, who's now an economics professor at Columbia, notes. "And that's when the economy collapses."

Or, as Adam Posen, another economist, puts it, "That's when the Depression became the Great Depression."

By 1932, consumption and investment had both collapsed, and stocks had fallen more than 80 percent from their peak.

As a young academic economist in the 1980s, Bernanke largely developed the theory that the loan officers' lost knowledge was a crucial cause of the Depression. He (and his co-author, Mark Gertler) referred to this lost knowledge as "informational capital." In plain English, it means that trust vanished from the banking sector.

The same thing is happening now. Financial markets are global, not local, today, so the problem isn't that the failure of any single bank locks customers out of the credit markets. Instead, the nasty surprises of the past 13 months -- the sort of turmoil that once would have been unthinkable -- have caused an effective breakdown in informational capital. Bankers now look at their longtime customers -- individuals, companies, other banks -- and think of that old refrain from a failed marriage: "I feel like I don't even know you."

Bear Stearns, for example, was supposed to have solid, tangible collateral standing behind some of its debts, so that certain lenders would be paid off no matter what. It didn't, and they weren't.

The current, more serious stage of the crisis began two weeks ago, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Fed's takeover of AIG. Those events created a new level of fear. Rather than making many loans, banks poured money into Treasury bills, which paid almost no interest but also came with almost no risk. On the loans they did make, banks demanded higher interest rates. Over the past two weeks, rates have generally continued to rise and these rates, not the stock market, are really what you should be watching.

The current fears can certainly seem irrational. Most households and businesses are still in fine shape, after all. So why aren't some banks stepping into the void and happily taking advantage of the newly high interest rates to earn some profit?

There are two chief reasons. One is fairly basic: Bankers are nervous that borrowers who look solid today may not turn out to be so solid. Think back to 1930, when the American economy seemed to be weathering the storm.

The second reason is a bit more complex. Banks own a lot of long-term assets (like your mortgage) and hold a lot of short-term debt (which is cheaper than long-term debt). To pay off this debt, they need to take out short-term loans.

But in the current environment, bankers worry that other banks could turn on them, out of fear, and stop extending that short-term credit. This, in a nutshell, brought about Monday's collapse of Wachovia and Glitnir Bank in Iceland. To avoid their fate, other banks are hoarding capital, instead of making seemingly profitable loans. And when capital is hoarded, other bank failures become all the more likely.

The crucial point is that a modern economy can't function when people can't easily get credit. It takes awhile for this to become obvious, since most companies and households don't take out big new loans every day. But it will eventually become obvious, and painfully so. Already, a lack of car loans has caused vehicle sales to fall further.

Could the current crisis end -- could banks decide they really are missing out on profitable investing opportunities -- without a $700 billion government fund to relieve Wall Street of its scariest holdings? Sure.

And is Congress right to fight for a workable program that's as inexpensive and as tough on Wall Street as possible? Absolutely.

But in the end, this really isn't about Wall Street. It's about reducing the risk that something really bad happens. It's about limiting the damage from the past decade's financial excesses.

Unfortunately, there is no way to accomplish that without also extending a helping hand to Wall Street. That is where our credit markets are, and we need them to start working again.

"We are facing a major national crisis," as Meyer Mishkin's grandson says. "To do nothing right now is to do what was done during the Great Depression."