More from and on Georgia

So the Commies ooops, the Russians, claim they're pulling out. So far, as that NY Times article I just linked to shows, no one has seen them packing anything, unless you count the looting that is widely reported. Plus ca change, and all that.

Anyway. A digest, of sorts, from around the Internet:

At Blackfive, Laughing Wolf posts a message from Olga, who grew up in/under the Soviet Union, and describes a previous incident.

By 1989, Georgian national movement for independence was using bona fide peaceful mass demonstrations to achieve its goal of declaring Georgian independence. On April 9, 1989 the square in front of the Georgian ‘parliament’ in Tbilisi was packed with people, civilians, including women and elderly. They were standing literally shoulder to shoulder from the morning into the night. We were watching Leningrad TV channel that had its cameramen on the location.

(Leningrad has always been somewhat ‘independent’ from Moscow and, therefore, had 2 own TV channels that used the freedoms brought by perestroika to show stuff that the official Moscow TV won’t air). As the meeting progressed into the quite a cold night, all of a sudden a commotion started at one of the corners of the square…It was the Russian Army, the paratroopers (desantiniki VDV) of the Pskov division (outside of Georgia) breaking up the demonstration using their tactical shovels, hacking their way from one end of the square to another. Since the square was packed standing room only, it was almost impossible for people to leave, through an opening offered by a couple of streets leading away from the square, quick enough to avoid the paratroopers with the shovels. I have no words to describe my horror as I watched that bloody scene on TV…

OPFOR recommends this Washington Post editorial by Fred Hiatt:

Who Made Russia Attack?
By Fred Hiatt
Monday, August 18, 2008; Page A11
As Russian forces loot and occupy a neighboring state, conscripting Georgian civilians at gunpoint to sweep their city streets, it's not uncommon, in Moscow or in Washington, to find America at fault.

Russia has gone over to the dark side -- or, in the Moscow version, has finally stood up for itself -- in understandable reaction to U.S. disrespect, according to this view. And the next president should learn a lesson from this: that there are limits to how far Russia can or should be pushed.

This narrative of American provocation cites a long list of grievances, but the principal and original sin is NATO expansion. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States encouraged the newly free nations of Central and Eastern Europe to join a military alliance whose founding purpose had been containment of the U.S.S.R. Russia hated the idea from the start, and the United States should have known that Moscow, once it recovered its strength, would exact retribution.

But was this really something that was done to, or even against, Russia? The vision behind NATO expansion under both President Bill Clinton and President Bush was a Europe whole and free. The carrot of NATO membership was dangled, first of all, to ease the dangers of transition. Applicant countries had to promise civilian control of their militaries, fair treatment of ethnic minorities and respect for international borders. Given the terrible things that might have accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Czechoslovakia -- Yugoslavia on a far greater scale -- the policy was amazingly successful.

...

But Vladimir Putin, who came to power in 2000, had a different vision of Russia's place in the world. Russia "has tended to feel absolutely secure only when everybody else, particularly those around its borders, feels absolutely insecure," Russia hand Strobe Talbott noted last week, and Putin fell squarely in that tradition. At home, he quashed political opposition and independent media. He brought Russia's mineral riches back under state control and then began using them -- oil and natural gas in particular -- to enforce obeisance abroad.

And he viewed NATO expansion as an affront, as something done to Russia, not because he imagined that Estonia or Georgia or even NATO itself ever would attack Russia, but because it complicated Russia's drive for hegemony. Seeing the world as a contest among spheres of influence, he could not imagine that the leaders behind NATO might see things differently.

The Small Wars Journal links to many articles and OpEds in their daily roundup, here. ("Europe and the Caucasus", towards bottom of page.)

Victor Davis Hansen had the following in his blog Works and Days:

Back to the 19th-century

We saw a glimpse of the back to the future world with the neo-czarist invasion of Vladimir Putin. Russia knows the great truth about the West: it will pour a half-million people into the street to protest the United States removing a homicidal dictator to foster democracy, but not a half-dozen to object to Russia attempting to remove a democratic government to foster dictatorship. Absolute standards of morality are passé; for the Left grandstanding about Abu Ghraib brings some sort of psychological recompense for being a blessed Westerner; objecting to Russian or Chinese behavior either is futile or gives no kick to a sense of self-loathing.

The Russians understand the Thucydidean truth that ‘the strong do as they please, and the weak do as they must.’ Putin et al. , as in the case of the Russian leveling of Grozny, have sized up the world—the sanctimonious EU, the blow-hard UN, the self-important World Court—and in response have rephrased Stalin’s quip “How many divisions do they have?” And they are right, of course. Old Gorby has been writing his usual post-Marxist nonsense with barely disguised glee over the resurgence of Russian pride and power. Most Western talking heads on television blather about “Bush and the neo-cons,” “We gave the Georgians the green light,” or “We went into Iraq”, in-between a sort of poorly-disguised respect for raw Russian power.

The only upside to this disaster is that Georgia was not in NATO and thus spared the alliance the humiliation of yawning while a member evoked Article V and learned its allies are out to their accustomed latte.

Professor Hansen is the first, but not the last, I know of who pointed out that, in an ironic way, it is a good thing that Georgia has not yet been granted NATO membership, because in all likelihood the only European members of NATO who would have been willing to do more than wring their hands and send off stern notes of protest would have been the US--and, let's face it, as soon as congress got involved, even that much is not certain.

Threats Watch has a few items, including a Rapid Recon piece here suggesting that Russia has moved SS21 balistic missiles into South Ossetia.

And the Christian Science Monitor had not one but two items in my daily RSS feed on the long-term ramifications of Soviet {there I go again!} Russian empire building.
(1. )

After Georgia, what future for NATO?
Russia's message – 'We're back and we're strong' – creates a new geopolitical dynamic in Eurasia for the Western alliance.
By Gordon Lubold | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the August 18, 2008 edition

Washington - The Russian Army's foray into Georgia this month has had enormous international impact. But the actions of its conventional forces served more to send a message to the West than to pose any significant military challenge much past its borders.

The immediate crisis in Georgia appears to be over for now. But as the West assesses what is clearly a new geopolitical dynamic in Eurasia, there is recognition that while Russia's military may not be as formidable as it once was, NATO and other Western allies must adapt quickly to counter the threat it does pose to its immediate neighbors.

That will undoubtedly lead to a broader debate about the future of NATO, its membership roster, and the resources it will need to create a viable impediment to Russia's military, whatever Moscow's ambitions may be.

and (2.)

'New Europe' urges West to rethink Russian ties
Seizing on the conflict in Georgia, East European countries are pushing for strong measures against an aggressive Moscow they say they know all too well.
By Robert Marquand | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the August 18, 2008 edition

Warsaw - They live in a historically battered region between West and East, the Rhine and the Volga, Berlin and Moscow. Now, as Russian tanks rumble in Georgia, the states of "new Europe" are urging the West to rethink its relationship with Russia and are pushing for new security and strong measures against an aggressive Moscow they say they know all too well.

From Poland to Ukraine, the Czech Republic to Bulgaria, Russia's invasion of Georgia with tanks, troops, and planes is described as a test of Western resolve. The former Soviet states are vowing to thwart Russian aims – in deals with the European Union, in a missile-defense pact with the US, and in trade and diplomacy.

Polish and Baltic officials, most of whom grew up under Soviet occupation, have long chafed at being described in Western Europe as too "Russia-phobic" in their oft-repeated warnings about Moscow's intentions. But now in this gritty capital, the refrain is, "We told you so."

The strength of Polish feeling against Russia is measured by the quick completion of a US missile defense pact last week, after 18 months of wrangling in Warsaw and Washington. While the US has stoutly argued that the missiles were meant as a shield against rogue attacks from Iran, their strategic value here has apparently shifted. Polish opposition to hosting 10 proposed missile silos dropped by 30 percent in the week after Russia's military move in Georgia, according to polls in Warsaw.